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the past, shifted toward the Republican
Party. This was true of Mexican-Ameri-
can, Jewish and labor groups. The out-
come of the election is understandably
disappointing to Blacks and it poses sev-
eral profound and perplexing questions
about Black political participation in the
years ahead.
One potential benefit of the outcome
of the election is that it may have freed
Black voters to think more independent-
ly, creatively, and pragmatically about
the pattern of their political participa-
tion in the future. The Republican Party,
led by Reagan, is in a good position to
reach out to Blacks, to demonstrate the
party's capacity to respond to their in-
terests, and to incorporate them to a
significant degree into the structure of
the party.
The election results also provide an
unprecedented opportunity for Blacks
to play a leading part in restructuring
the Democratic Party as it seeks to re-
cover from the serious defeat of
November.
Another potential benefit of the out-
come of the 1980 election is that it chal-
lenges Blacks to a new and perhaps more
sophisticated style of politics. Undoubt-
edly, a Reagan Administration will seek
different approaches to some of the
chronic national problems that Blacks
have sought to address for the past sev-
eral decades. Blacks will need to formu-
late some of their specific objectives and
modify some of the strategies they have
advocated in seeking to protect their
interests.
Still another likely benefit for Blacks
might derive from the need to reempha-
me self-help. The tendency to focus on
the government for solutions to many of
the pressing problems Blacks face, some-
times overshadows the clear and urgent
need for a more vigorous effort by Blacks
to achieve social and economic advance-
ment for themselves in spite of continu-
ing obstacles to their advancement.
There are many areas in which govem-
rnent can only be a partner-and for
Blacks a reluctan t partner - in
development.
To emphasize the likely benefits of a
Reagan presidency is not to ignore or
underestimate the actual and potential
problems it poses for Blacks and other
disadvantaged minorities. Many com-
mentators have hastened to interpret
the outcome of the election as represent-
ing a fundamental ideological shift by
the electorate, one conferring a mandate
for sweeping retrenchment and retreat
from much of the social progress of re-
cent years. However, the available data
on the attitudes and perceptions of the
electorate provide no conclusive evi-
dence for such an interpretation. On the
contrary, those data suggest that the
electorate sought mainly a change in
leadership and improvement in the
country's economy, military strength,
and international standing. An assump-
tion by the Administration that it is
mandated to implement sweeping con-
servative reforms could indeed be deva-
stating for Blacks, other minorities, and
all the poor and disadvantaged in the'
society.
The history of racial discrimination in
this society and efforts to combat it in-
dicate that the federal government has
been vital to the survival of Blacks. Fur-
thermore, while they are not the only,
or even the principal beneficiaries of the
major social programs of the past two
decades geared to assist the low-income
and the otherwise disadvantaged, a
large proportion of the Black population
is especially dependent on them and
thus highly vulnerable to any major cut-
backs. Anything but the most cautions
moves toward reforming social pro-
grams, or further sharing resources and
power with state and local governments,
could be extremely detrimental to
Blacks and require them to struggle
relentlessly for their survival. If eternal
vigilance is the price of liberty for all
Americans, it is considerably more so
for Black Americans as they approach





By Charles V. Hamilton
Historically and currently, Black leader-
ship in this country has had to submit to
at least one crucial test of legitimacy. It
has had to withstand almost constant
attacks from those who would question
both its judgments and its motives.
And in the process, it has been strength-
ened and made viable. Historically, for
the most part, it has not been an elected
leadership, in the sense of a represented
constituency choosing it at the polls-
that has only occurred substantially in
the last decade or so- but its claim to
speak for a designated group has not
been taken for granted, inasmuch as it
has not always (some might suggest,
ever)been simply taken at its word.
If vast numbers of people continue to
pay dues and otherwise support the or-
ganization, it is reasonable to conclude
that the leadership and its programs and
processes are consented to in largemeas-
ure. This might not be entirely satisfac-
tory to one who requires a more direct
periodic electoral mechanism for sanc-
tioning leaders. But neither does it jus-
tify the conclusion that "there is no
institutional mechanism" to assess a
claim of leadership.
Without question, there is a clear ideo-
logical preference on the part of most
(certainly not all) Black leaders for what
can be characterized as a "liberal" ap-
proach to public policy. Even where this
liberalism is not associated with the
Democratic Party or with a political
party more liberal (or socialist) in orien-
tation, it usually comes down on the
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-8 side of a more forceful and activist role
by the government, especially the fed-
eral government. In this sense, much of
the national Black leadership, then, ad-
mittedly is at variance with the ideolog-
ical stances of its conservative critics
(such as Walter Williams and Thomas
Sowell).
When one uses the term "Black lead-
er," the reference is to two things.
"Black" refers to racial identity; "lead-
er" refers to a role. When used together,
the words take on an additional mean-
ing: one who is racially Black in a lead-
ership role and who speaks and acts on
matters of specific (but not, necessarily,
exclusive) concern to Black people as a
direct purpose of occupying that role.
Thus, "Black leader" refers to racial and
role characteristics, but also to issue
orientation. Therefore, if one were ra-
cially Black and, say, a mayor of an all-
white town who never spoke or acted on
issues of specific concern to Blacks as
such, it would not be proper to desig-
nate such a mayor as a "Black leader."
That person would be a leader (mayor)
who was Black. In this example, the fact
that the town was all-white was not the
important factor alone, but rather that
in the leadership role, the person did not
speak or act on specific racial issues.
This does not imply a lack of interest in
certain issues, but rather that such a
person should not be defined as a "lead-
er" of Blacks simply because he or she is
Black and occupies a particular leader-
ship role. All too often, we find that
prominent Black people (whom I will
call "leading Blacks") are confused with
"Black leaders."
The tendency to ascribe the "Black
leader" role to prominent Black ath-
letes, entertainers and educators simply
because they are prominent and perhaps
occasionally address themselves to is-
sues of concern to Blacks should be
resisted. This is not to deny them the
right or opportunity to speak out, but
merely to suggest that when they do so,
they should be understood as represent-
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ing their own views in their individual
capacities as concerned citizens. They
should not be burdened with the mantle
of being "Black leaders."
When some Black leaders discuss
economic issues such as full employ-
ment and inflation, they are admonished
to stay within the confines of a narrowly
understood definition of "civil rights"
and racial discrimination. This severely
restricts the role, range, and ultimate
effectiveness of such people.
Other ethnic leaders have not had the
"policy expansion" problem because
their constituents' economic and other
needs have not remained so identified
with their ethnic identity. This is not
the case with Black Americans. If Black
leaders, therefore, wish to be relevant to
the needs of their Black constituents, of
necessity, they will be required to ad-
dress a range of issues affecting the so-
ciety as a whole. Their legitimacy with
their constituents demands it, and the
larger society ought to be prepared for
such extension of involvement.
The more influential, powerful, and
resourceful the group, the more its lead-
ership is stable and accorded higher rec-
ognition, internally and externally. In
addition, the more powerful the group,
the more likely its leadership is able to
deliver benefits to the constituents.
The weaker the group, the more it
needs many things, and the more de-
mands it will make on its leaders to pro-
duce. But the capacity to produce is con-
strained precisely by the group's relative
weakness-almost a Catch-22 situation.
This means that the followers tend to
keep their leaders on a "short string."
That is, they tend to distrust them more
than other groups (usually stronger) dis-
trust their leaders.
Some Black leaders have always been
subject to the charge of being "out of
touch" with their lower-class Black con-
stituents. Basically, such charges stem
from ideological differences-from the
Left and the Right. Such leaders have
been accused of being more interested
in "status" goals than in "weliare"-
goals, and more concerned about achiev-
ing benefits for a Blackmiddle-class than
a Black under-class. If one returns to
just the turn of the century, it would be
difficult to document this allegation
with any degree of definitivenes .With-
out question, one could discern, for in-
stance, a difference of emphasis between
leadership groups. But these differences
reflected more variance of notions about
how to affect change for the masses
rather than anything else. It would be 2
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difficult to document a belief that any
major Black leadership group purpose-
fully sought to retard the advance of the
race as a whole.
If current Black leadership (here the
reference is to the more visible and in
many ways more organizationally sound
leadership) is to be faulted, I would sus-
pect it could be in the area of erring on
the side of superficial unity. There has
been a tendency in recent years to play
down, to minimize the obvious differ-
ences that exist among the leadership
groups.
There should be more overt recogni-
tion on the part of the Black leadership
of fundamental differences between
them. There should be much more open
discussion of those differences, pin-
pointing precisely the issues of disagree-
ment. This is done more often privately
than publicly, and it should be surfaced.
This will not likely hurt the Black strug-
gle. On the contrary, it will likely help
it and give it a leadership credibility it
now seeks to sustain.
Like most of their Black constituents,
they (Black leaders) are not too far to the
left or right in American politics. To be
sure, they are liberal, but they are also
political pragmatists. They have every
intention of challenging racism in the
country, of pushing for more equitable
economic policies, and of trying to forge
viable coalitions with other groups that
share those goals. Some are more com-
fortable with their corporate connec-
tions than others would like them to be
or want to be themselves. They have ar-
rived at this 'place and time with a record
of action and achievement about which
they need not apologize. They remain
vulnerable to attacks from within and
without but they need not feel especially
apologetic about their failures. Their
failure to deliver certain benefits to their
constituents has been, as Dorothy
Height indicated, a function largely of
their circumstantial inabilities-not






With prime interest rates in December,
1980 surpassing the previous 20 percent
record of April, 1980, the economic
growth lagging, it is almost a certainty
that this nation will be sliding into an-
otherrecession in 1981.
Over the years, repeated cycles of re-
cessions have consistently eroded many
of the economic advances of Blacks.
During the past 26 years, this nation
has experienced a succession of at least
six recessions (1953-54, 1957-58, 1960-
61, 1969-71, 1974-75 and 1980). Before
Blacks had a chance to recover from one
recession, they were subjected to an-
other. Thus, the Black community is
still reeling from the cumulative effects
of a quarter century of recessions.
The peak unemployment rate of 7.8
percent during the 1980 recession was
significantly higher than the 7.3 percent
average jobless rate for the peak of the
preceding six recessions. In fact, based
on the level of unemployment, Blacks
were more severely impacted by the
seven-month 1980 slump than they were
by the 17-month 1974-75 recession-
which all analysts agree was the most
devastating decline since the Great De-
pression of the 1930s.While the number
of unemployed white workers declined
by 562,000 between 1975 and 1980,
there were 200,000 more Blacks unem-
ployed in 1980 (at 1.7million) than there
were at the peak of the 1974-75 reces-
sion (at l.5 million).
The official jobless rate forBlack teen-
agers was 36 percent, while the official 9
number of unemployed Black teenagers
was about 364,000. But the National
Urban League Hidden Unemployed In-
dex placed the actual jobless rate for
Black teenagers at 59 percent in 1980
and the actual number of unemployed
Black teenagers at more than double
(about 800,(00) the official level. It is
also important to point out that while 59
percent of Black teenagers may be un-
employed as a national average, in spe-
cific inner-city areas the actual jobless
rates for Black youth may be closer to
80-90percent.
In every work category, Black youths
were more willing to work at lower pay-
ing jobs than either Hispanic or white
youths. For example, one-third (34 per-
cent) of Black youth were willing to
wash dishes at $2.50 an hour, compared
to 24 percent of Hispanic and 19 percent
of white youth. Similarly, almost half
(44 percent) of Black youth were willing
to work at a hamburger place at $2.50 an
hour, compared to 33 percent ofHispanic
and 28 percent of white youth. These
findings indicate that it is white, not
Black youth who are least willing to
accept lower paying jobs.
A more recent analysis of employ-
.ment pattems by the National Urban
League revealed that Blacks, Hispanics
and Asians were less likely than whites
to secure their proportionate share of
new jobs. For example, while Blacks
accounted for 15 percent of the increase
in the total U. S.working-age population
between 1975-80, they obtained only
10 percent of the 12.5 million new jobs
over that period. Similarly, while His-
panics made up 15percent of the growth
in the total working-age population be-
tween 1975-80, they got only 11 percent
of the new jobs. On the other hand,
whites obtained three-fourths (74 per-
cent) of the new jobs over the last five
years, although they accounted for only
64 percent of the growth in the working-
age population. And white women se-
cured over half of the new jobs, while
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